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FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 06/11/2014 INDEX NO. 135484/2014 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/11/2014 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF RICHMOND SUMMONS AND NOTICE JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Index No. _______________ Plaintiff, Date Filed:______________ -against- Donnie Williams; City of New York Environmental Control Board; City of New York Parking Violations Bureau; City of New York Transit Adjudication Bureau, "JOHN DOE", said name being fictitious, it being the intention of Plaintiff to designate any and all occupants of premises being foreclosed herein, and any parties, corporations or entities, if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises, Defendants. PROPERTY ADDRESS: 63 Gridley Avenue, Staten Island, NY 10303 TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the complaint in this action and to serve a copy of your answer, or a notice of appearance on the attorneys for the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service. The United States of America, if designated as a defendant in this action, may appear within sixty (60) days of service hereof. In case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the complaint. 09-078169 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF RICHMOND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, COMPLAINT Plaintiff, Index No. _______________ -against- Date Filed:______________ Donnie Williams; City of New York Environmental Control Board; City of New York Parking Violations Bureau; City of New York Transit Adjudication Bureau, "JOHN DOE", said name being fictitious, it being the intention of Plaintiff to designate any and all occupants of premises being foreclosed herein, and any parties, corporations or entities, if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged premises, Defendants. The Plaintiff herein, by its Attorneys, Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC, complains of the defendants above named, and for its cause of action, alleges that: First: The Plaintiff herein, at all times hereinafter mentioned was and still is a duly authorized Corporation or Association and having an office at c/o 7255 Baymeadows Way, Jacksonville, Florida 32256. PLAINTIFF FURTHER ALLEGES UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF Second: The defendants set forth in Schedule "A" reside or have a place of business at the address set forth therein and are made defendants in this action in the capacities therein alleged and for the purpose of foreclosing and extinguishing any other right, title or interest said defendants may have in the subject premises. 09-078169 Third: The United States of America, The People of the State of New York, The State Tax Commission of the State of New York, the Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York and all other agencies or instrumentalities of the Federal, State or local government (by whatever name designated) if made parties to this action and if appearing in Schedule "B", are made parties solely by reason of the interest set forth in Schedule "B" and for no other reason. Fourth: Heretofore, the defendant(s), Donnie Williams, for the purpose of securing to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., its successors and assigns, the sum of $299,000.00, duly made a certain bond, note, consolidation, extension, modification, recasting, or assumption agreement, as the case may be, wherein and whereby they bound themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and each and every one of them, jointly and severally, in the amount of said sum of money, all as more fully appears together with the terms of repayment of said sum or rights of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., its successors and assigns, in said bond, note or other instrument, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Fifth: As security for the payment of said indebtedness, a consolidation, extension and/or modification agreement was executed, acknowledged and delivered to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., wherein and whereby the mortgagor(s) named therein mortgaged, bargained, granted an interest in and/or sold to the mortgagee, its successors and assigns, the premises more particularly described therein, hereinafter called "mortgaged premises", under certain conditions with rights, duties and privileges between or among them as more fully appears in said consolidation, extension and/or modification agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Said Loan Modification (hereinafter “the Mortgage”) 09-078169 modified the mortgage(s) referred to in Schedule "D" hereof to form a single first mortgage lien in the sum of $299,000.00. Sixth: The Plaintiff is the current owner and holder of the subject mortgage and note, or has been delegated the authority to institute a mortgage foreclosure action by the owner and holder of the subject mortgage and note. If Plaintiff is not the original owner and holder of the subject note and mortgage then information regarding the chain of title will be contained in Schedule "D". Seventh: The said mortgages were duly recorded and the mortgage tax due thereon was duly paid on the recorded instrument in the proper County Clerk's Office at the place and time which appears thereon. Plaintiff shall pay the requisite mortgage tax attributed to the Modification Agreement, if any, prior to Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. Eighth: The defendant(s), Donnie Williams, so named, have failed and neglected to comply with the conditions of said mortgage, bond or note by omitting and failing to pay the monthly payments of principal, interest, taxes, assessments, water rates, insurance premiums, escrow and/or other charges, and accordingly, the plaintiff has duly elected and does hereby elect to call due the entire amount presently secured by the mortgage described in paragraph "FIFTH" hereof. Ninth: Heretofore and prior to the commencement of this action, part of the original principal sum may have been paid to apply on said indebtedness and there remains due the amount set forth in Schedule "C". 09-078169 Tenth: In order to protect its security, the plaintiff has paid, or will pay, as may be compelled during the pendency of this action, local taxes, assessments, water rates, insurance premiums, inspections and other charges affecting the mortgaged premises, and the plaintiff requests that any sums thus paid by it for said purposes (together with interests thereon) should be added to the sum otherwise due and be deemed secured by the said mortgage and be adjudged a valid lien on the mortgaged premises, the amount of which will ultimately be determined by the Court. Eleventh: The defendants herein have, or claim to have, some interest in or lien upon, said mortgaged premises or some part thereof, which interest or lien, if any, has accrued subsequent to, or is otherwise subordinate to, the lien of plaintiff's mortgage. Twelfth: There are no pending proceedings at law or otherwise to collect or enforce said bond/note and mortgage and there is no other action pending which has been brought to recover said mortgage debt or any part thereof. Thirteenth: The Schedules, Exhibits and other items attached to this Complaint are expressly incorporated and made a part of this Complaint for all purposes with the same force and effect as if they were completely and fully set forth herein wherever reference has been made to each or any of them. Fourteenth: By reason of the foregoing, there is now due and owing to the plaintiff upon said bond, note, assumption agreement, consolidation agreement, or recasting agreement, the unpaid principal balance set forth in Schedule "C", and such other fees, costs, late charges, and interest, the amount of which will be determined by the Court. 09-078169 Fifteenth: The mortgage provides that, in the case of foreclosure, the mortgaged premises may be sold in one parcel. Sixteenth: The Plaintiff shall not be deemed to have waived, altered, released or changed the election hereinbefore made by reason of the payment or performance, after the date of the commencement of this action, of any or all of the defaults mentioned herein; and such election shall continue and remain effective until the costs and disbursem*nts of this action, and all present and future defaults under the Note and Mortgage and occurring prior to the discontinuance of this action are fully paid and cured. Seventeenth: Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, this action may be deemed to be an attempt to collect a debt, on behalf of Plaintiff. Any information obtained as a result of this action will be used for that purpose. Eighteenth: If the subject note and mortgage fall within the prescribed definition of a subprime home loan or high-cost home loan as identified under section six-l or six-m of the New York State Banking Law, then Plaintiff has complied with all the provisions of section five-hundred ninety-five of the New York State Banking Law and any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, section six-l or six-m of the New York State Banking Law and section thirteen hundred four of New York State Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). Nineteenth: Plaintiff has complied with the provisions of RPAPL § 1306, if applicable. WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment: (a) Adjudging and decreeing the amounts due the plaintiff for principal, interest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, if and as provided for in the said mortgage; 09-078169 (b) That the defendants and all persons claiming by, through or under them, or either or any of them, subsequent to the commencement of this action and every other person or corporation whose right, title conveyance or encumbrance is subsequent to or subsequently recorded, may be barred and forever foreclosed of all right, claim, lien, or interest, or equity of redemption in and to said mortgaged premises; (c) That the said mortgaged premises, or such part thereof as may be necessary to raise the amounts then due for principal, interest, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, allowances and disbursem*nts, together with any monies advanced and paid, may be decreed to be sold according to law; (d) That out of the monies arising from the sale thereof, the plaintiff may be paid the amounts then due on said bond/note and mortgage and any sum which may have been paid by the plaintiff to protect the lien of plaintiff's mortgage as herein set forth, with interest upon said amounts from the dates of the respective payments and advances thereof, the costs and expenses of this action, additional allowance, if any, and reasonable attorney's fees, if and as provided for in the mortgage, rider or other agreement, so far as the amount of such money properly applicable thereto will pay the same; (e) That either or any of the parties to this action may become a purchaser upon such sale; (f) That this Court forthwith appoint a Receiver of the rents and profits of said premises with the usual powers and duties; 09-078169 SCHEDULE A – DEFENDANTS DEFENDANTS CAPACITY Donnie Williams Owner of record and Obligor by virtue of the 63 Gridley Avenue Consolidation and/or Modification Agreement Staten Island, NY 10303 referred to in Schedule D attached hereto. “JOHN DOE” Said name being fictitious, it being the intention of Plaintiff to designate any and all occupants, tenants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises being foreclosed herein. 09-078169 SCHEDULE B – DEFENDANTS DEFENDANTS CAPACITY City of New York Environmental Control To cut off any possible liens filed by the Board Environmental Control Board with the Clerk of 100 Church Street Richmond County. New York, NY 10007 City of New York Parking Violations Bureau To cut off any possible liens filed by the New 100 Church Street York City Parking Violations Bureau with the New York, NY 10007 Clerk of Richmond County. City of New York Transit Adjudication Bureau To cut off any possible liens filed by the 130 Livingston Street Transit Adjudication Bureau with the Clerk of Brooklyn, NY 11201 Richmond County. SCHEDULE C MORTGAGE INFORMATION 1. Original Amount of Bond/Note/ Consolidation or Modification Agreement $299,000.00 2. Last installment due and paid September 1, 2013 3. Date of first unpaid installment/ default date October 1, 2013 AMOUNT DUE 4. Principal balance owing $291,856.79 5. *Interest @ 3.307% from September 1, 2013 To Be Calculated at Judgment 6. Late charges as per the terms of the Note To Be Calculated at Judgment 7. Taxes Advanced by Plaintiff To Be Calculated at Judgment 8. Escrow Advances To Be Calculated at Judgment * Interest will continue to accrue at the contract bond/note/loan agreement rate, until a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale has been entered in the proper County Clerk’s Office, at which time the interest rate will be calculated at the legal rate of 9.00%. 09-078169 SCHEDULE D The instrument being foreclosed herein is a Consolidated and /or Modified Mortgage dated December 1, 2012, executed by Donnie Williams, as Mortgagor(s) to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Mortgagee, to secure the sum of $299,000.00. The foregoing instrument consolidated and/or modified the following mortgage(s): The Mortgage given by Donnie Williams to Washington Mutual Bank, FA to secure the sum of $270,900.00 dated March 19, 2007 and recorded on April 2, 2007 in Land Document Number 187696. The Note and Mortgage were transferred to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, and said transfer was memorialized by an Assignment of Mortgage executed on January 14, 2014 and recorded January 29, 2014 in Land Document Number 512205. In addition, the underlying Note was indorsed by the original lender or its agent, successor, or assign, and was delivered to Plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. 09-078169
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Defendants argue the first amended complaint does not satisfy the elements of afraudulent transfer under the UFTA because plaintiffs have not alleged facts to supporttheir standing as creditors. In opposition, plaintiffs identify the allegations of the complaintdemonstrating plaintiffs provided a total of $56,000 to defendant Ramirez toward thepurchase of the Corona property and additionally paid the mortgage payments directlyto Ramirez for twenty years. (FAC, ¶¶ 20-23, 26.) The payment of this money to Ramirezwith the understanding it was secured as equity in the Corona property, as alleged,supports finding plaintiffs have a right to payment of these sums and qualifies them ascreditors as defined by the UFTA. (Civ. Code § 3439.01, subd. (b)-(c). Defendants additionally argue plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim of fraud inhaving made the transfer in order to satisfy the element of actual intent to defraud inCivil Code section 3439.04, subdivision (a)(1). Defendants interpret the element to requirea showing of all elements of a claim for fraud: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge offalsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resultingdamage. This interpretation is not supported by the statute. The statute defines how to determine actual intent, as used in Civil Code section3439.04, subdivision (a)(1), by listing factors (1) through (11) for consideration. (Civ. Code§ 3439.04, subd. (b).) Here, plaintiffs have alleged facts that support several of the factors.Defendant Santos is alleged to have paid $0 in exchange for the grant deed to theCorona property. (FAC ¶¶ 38, 58.) This would speak to “[w]hether the value ofconsideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of theasset transferred ….” (Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (b)(8).) Santos is alleged to haveconspired with defendant Ramirez in transferring the property and sale of the property todefraud plaintiffs, which would characterize her role as one of an insider. (FAC ¶¶ 57-58.)This is consistent with considering “[w]hether the transfer or obligation was to an insider.”(Civ. Code, §3439.04, subd. (b)(1). Indeed, all defendants are alleged to have conspired,aided and abetted, and ratified these acts with the intent to defraud plaintiffs1. (FAC, ¶¶12-16) Accordingly, the allegations of the first amended complaint are sufficient to statea cause of action for fraudulent transfer against defendants Ramirez and Santos. Havingfound the allegations of the fraudulent transfer are sufficient, plaintiffs have adequatelyalleged facts to support their standing to bring an action for quiet title. Further, theallegations support the cause of action for financial elder abuse based on the fraudulenttransfer of the property. (FAC, ¶ 93.) Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint properly states the challenged causes of actionfor fraudulent transfer, quiet title, and financial elder abuse. As a result, the demurrer tothe entire first amended complaint is overruled. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: KCK on 08/14/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)1These allegations go to defendants’ argument that defendants Simmons, Alvarez and Envisiondid not assist in the fraudulent conveyance that serves as the basis for the fourth cause of actionfor financial elder abuse.
Ruling
MARIA ELENA ESTRADA VS JUAN MONCADA ET AL
Aug 14, 2024 |BC696401
Case Number: BC696401 Hearing Date: August 14, 2024 Dept: 61 MARIA ELENA ESTRADA VS JUAN MONCADA ET ALTENTATIVE Plaintiff Maria Elena Estrada (Plaintiff) move to appoint an elisor for Defendant and Judgment Debtor Antonio Morales (Morales), to execute documents and transfers that Morales was ordered to execute to effectuate this courts quiet title judgment. (Motion at p. 9.) At issue here is the court's authority and reasonableness in issuing the order appointing the elisor. As used in the case at bar, consistent with its common legal meaning, an elisor is a person appointed by the court to perform functions like the execution of a deed or document. (Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1635, fn. 2, [274 Cal.Rptr. 672] (Rayan).) A court typically appoints an elisor to sign documents on behalf of a recalcitrant party in order to effectuate its judgments or orders, where the party refuses to execute such documents. (See Ibid.) We note that under Code of Civil Procedure section 262.8, elisor specifically means a person designated by the court to execute process or orders in an action or proceeding involving the sheriff *1021 and/or coroner. Code of Civil Procedure's use of the term is not at issue in this case. Courts use elisors in matters like this one to enforce their orders. Under section 128, subdivision (a)(4), [e]very court shall have the power .... [¶] ... [¶] [t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending therein. This statute has codified the principle of [t]he inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued.... (Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, 679, [140 Cal.Rptr. 361].) In Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 10201021, the court held that the trial court did not err in appointing the clerk of the court as an elisor to sign the escrow documents on behalf of the defendant. (Id. at p. 1020.) This courts judgment of August 12, 2020, directed Defendant Morales to convey to Plaintiff any and all interest in the property on Naomi Avenue in Los Angeles that is the subject of this action. Prior to judgment, Plaintiff obtained an order to serve Morales by publication because they were unable to locate him. (Estrada Decl. ¶¶ 1521.) Since judgment, Plaintiff is still unable to locate Morales, has not been contacted by him, and has been unable to secure his conveyance as ordered by the court. (Estrada Decl. ¶¶ 2730.) Because of the inability to contact Morales, Plaintiff has shown that appointment of an elisor is necessary to effectuate this courts judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 128, subd. (a)(4). The motion is therefore GRANTED.
Ruling
JOHN LE NGUYEN VS MINH LE NGUYEN
Aug 16, 2024 |22AHCV00822
Case Number: 22AHCV00822 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT JOHN LE NGUYEN, Plaintiff(s), vs. MINH LE NGUYEN, Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22AHCV00822 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. August 16, 2024 ) On February 27, 2024, plaintiff John Le Nguyen (Plaintiff) filed this motion requesting the Court appoint a referee to carry out the sale of the property located at 2070 Meridian Avenue, South Pasadena, California 91030 (the South Pasadena Property) and order that the costs of the sale and fees of the referee be paid from the sale proceeds. At the previous hearing on July 12, 2024, the Court continued the hearing on this motion and ordered the parties to meet and confer on selecting a referee. The parties were also ordered to submit a joint statement in which they would nominate up to 3 individuals who are willing to serve as a referee in this matter and include each individuals curricula vitae, fee schedules, and any other information. The joint statement was also supposed to include a description of efforts made to reach an agreement on who the referee should be. The Court informed the parties that if the parties were unable to reach an agreement, the Court would choose one of the nominees identified in the report and appoint them as a referee for the sale of the South Pasadena Property. No joint statement has been filed since the last hearing. Accordingly, the Court has no nominees for reference to choose from and the motion to appoint a referee is DENIED without prejudice. Dated this 16th day of August, 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.
Ruling
SLAUSON-FISHBURN ASSOCIATES, A CALIFORNIA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP VS YUAN LI
Aug 15, 2024 |23NWCV02598
Case Number: 23NWCV02598 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: C SLAUSON-FISHBURN ASSOCIATES v. LI CASE NO.: 23NWCV02598 HEARING: 08/15/24 #8 Defendant LIs unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Moving Party to give Notice. No Opposition filed as of August 12, 2024. This unlawful detainer action was filed on August 11, 2023. Possession is no longer at issue. Defendant LI seeks to leave to file a cross-complaint to state a claim for unlawful lockout. CCP §428.50 states: (a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b). Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of action. The Court finds that it would serve the interests of justice to grant Defendant leave to file its proposed Cross-Complaint. It is best to avoid multiplicity or duplicity of actions. The Motion is GRANTED. Defendant LI is ORDERED to file and serve the Cross-Complaint within 30 days.
Ruling
County of Sonoma vs Manzo
Aug 14, 2024 |SCV-267833
SCV-267833, County of Sonoma v. ManzoThis matter is on calendar for a motion by Plaintiff County of Sonoma (“County” or “Plaintiff”)for an order to show cause re: contempt against defendants Lisa Figueroa and Gabriel Manzo(together “Defendants”).There is no proof of service reflecting that the Defendants are in receipt of the original motion.The motion is therefore DENIED without prejudice.
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Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., v. Daniel R. Salt, Christine Salt, Citibank, N.A., New York City Parking Violations Bureau, New York City Environmental Control Board, New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #12 the last twelve names being fictitious and unknown to plaintiff, the persons or parties intended being the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises, described in the complaint,
Aug 14, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135350/2024
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Carrington Mortgage Services Llc v. Barbara Cafaro, As Potential Administrator And Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, William Holtz, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Kathleen Esposito, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Nancy Strype, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Maryellen Holtz, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Any And All Known And Unknown Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, Assignees, Lienors, Creditors, Trustees, And All Other Parties Claiming An Interst By, Through, Under Or Against The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, United States Of America Acting On Behalf Of The Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development, United States Of America Acting On Behalf Of The Department Of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service, New York State Department Of Taxation And Finance, Richmond County Savings Bank, Nka Flagstar Bank, National Association, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #10, Said Names Being Fictitious And Unknown To Plaintiff, Intended To Be Possible Tenants Or Occupants Of The Premises, Or Corporations, Persons, Or Other Entities Having Or Claiming A Lien Upon The Mortgaged Premises
Jul 22, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135320/2024
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Carrington Mortgage Services Llc v. Barbara Cafaro, As Potential Administrator And Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, William Holtz, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Kathleen Esposito, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Nancy Strype, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Maryellen Holtz, As Heir, Devisee, Distributee Of The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, Any And All Known And Unknown Heirs, Devisees, Grantees, Assignees, Lienors, Creditors, Trustees, And All Other Parties Claiming An Interst By, Through, Under Or Against The Estate Of Maureen Kramaroff Aka Maureen V. Kramaroff, United States Of America Acting On Behalf Of The Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development, United States Of America Acting On Behalf Of The Department Of Treasury - Internal Revenue Service, New York State Department Of Taxation And Finance, Richmond County Savings Bank, Nka Flagstar Bank, National Association, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #10, Said Names Being Fictitious And Unknown To Plaintiff, Intended To Be Possible Tenants Or Occupants Of The Premises, Or Corporations, Persons, Or Other Entities Having Or Claiming A Lien Upon The Mortgaged Premises
Jul 22, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135320/2024
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Mortgage Assets Management, Llc v. Kim Baydal Caridi AS HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF THERESA BAYDAL, Tammy Baydal AKA TAMMY AYALA AS HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF THERESA BAYDAL, Debra Perez AKA DEBORAH PEREZ AS HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF THERESA BAYDAL, Gary Baydal AS HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF THERESA BAYDAL, Unknown Heirs Of Theresa Baydal If Living, And If He/She Be Dead, Any And All Persons Unknown To Plaintiff, Claiming, Or Who May Claim To Have An Interest In, Or General Or Specific Lien Upon The Real Property Described In This Action;, Such Unknown Persons Being Herein Generally Described And Intended To Be Included In Wife, Widow, Husband, Widower, Heirs At Law, Next Of Kin, Descendants, Executors, Administrators, Devisees,, Legatees, Creditors, Trustees, Committees, Lienors, And Assignees Of Such Deceased, Any And All Persons Deriving Interest In Or Lien Upon, Or Title To Said Real Property By, Through Or Under, Them, Or Either Of Them, And Their Respective Wives, Widows, Husbands, Widowers, Heirs At Law, Next Of Kin, Descendants, Executors, Administrators, Devisees, Legatees, Creditors,, Trustees, Committees, Lienors, And Assigns, All Of Whom And Whose Names, Except As Stated, Are Unknown To Plaintiff, People Of The State Of New York,, United States Of America On Behalf Of The Irs, United States Of America On Behalf Of The Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development, New York City Parking Violations Bureau, John Doe
Aug 15, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135351/2024
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Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Successor By Merger To Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association, as Trustee f/k/a Norwest Bank Minnesota, National Association, as Trustee for Renaissance HEL Trust 2004-2 v. Peter E. Tartaglione, Barbara E. Tartaglione, Wilmington Trust, National Association, Not In Its Individual Capacity But Solely As Trustee Under The Greenwich Investors Xl Pass- Through Trust Agreement Dated As Of March 1, 2012, Capital One Bank (Usa), N.A., Ford Motor Credit Company, Llc, Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, New York State Department Of Taxation And Finance, United States Of America, City Of New York Environmental Control Board, City Of New York Parking Violations Bureau, City Of New York Transit Adjudication Bureau, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #12, The Last Twelve Names Being Fictitious And Unknown To Plaintiff, The Persons Or Parties Intended Being The Tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the Subject Property described in the Complaint
Aug 07, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135339/2024
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State Of New York Mortgage Agency v. Steven Carrigan, John Doe
Aug 12, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135346/2024
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Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., v. Daniel R. Salt, Christine Salt, Citibank, N.A., New York City Parking Violations Bureau, New York City Environmental Control Board, New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #12 the last twelve names being fictitious and unknown to plaintiff, the persons or parties intended being the tenants, occupants, persons or corporations, if any, having or claiming an interest in or lien upon the premises, described in the complaint,
Aug 14, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135350/2024
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Pennymac Loan Services, Llc v. Anthony Silva, Johnika Manuel, Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development, New York City Environmental Control Board, New York City Parking Violations Bureau, New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, John Doe #1 Through John Doe #10, The Last Ten Names Being Fictitious And Unknown To The Plaintiff, The Person Or Parties Intended Being The Persons Or Parties, If Any, Having Or Claiming An Interest In Or Lien Upon The Mortgaged Premises Described In The Complaint
Aug 02, 2024 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |135336/2024
